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Summary. In a standard framework of choice theory, we formulate two con-
trasting principles for social choice under the eﬃciency-equity trade-oﬀ. The
equity-ﬁrst principle states that we should select from equitable allocations if
any, but if the equity criterion is not at all eﬀective for selection either because
all the available allocations are equitable or because no allocation is equitable,
we should select from Pareto eﬃcient allocations. The eﬃciency-ﬁrst principle
switches the roles of the equity criterion and the eﬃciency criterion above. We
examine the choice-consistency properties, known as Path Independence (Ar-
row, 1963) and Contraction Consistency (Chernoﬀ, 1954), of the social choice
correspondences satisfying the equity-ﬁrst or the eﬃciency-ﬁrst principle. Sev-
eral possibility and impossibility theorems are obtained, which indicate that
possibility of consistent social decisions depends crucially on which principle
we take as well as what is the precise notion of equity.
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1 Introduction
It is not rare that multiple criteria are applied to make individ-
ual or social decisions. In the context of resource allocation prob-
lems, most prominent criteria are eﬃciency and equity of allocations.
Pareto eﬃciency is probably the most widely accepted criterion among
economists, but it is silent about the distributional equity of allocations.
On the other hand, several concepts of equity have been proposed and
extensively studied in welfare economics. Two of them are central: no-
envy (Foley, 1967, and Kolm, 1972) and egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner
and Schmeidler, 1978). We say that an allocation is envy-free if no agent2 Koichi Tadenuma
prefers the consumption bundle of any other agent, and that an allo-
cation is egalitarian-equivalent if there is a consumption bundle, called
the reference bundle, such that every agent is indiﬀerent between the
bundle and his own.
However, as Kolm (1972) and Feldman and Kirman (1974) pointed
out, there is a fundamental conﬂict between the Pareto eﬃciency crite-
rion and the no-envy criterion. There often exist two allocations x and
y such that x is Pareto superior to y whereas x is not envy-free but y
is. If these two allocations fx;yg are the only policy options available
at the time, we cannot attain an allocation that is both Pareto eﬃ-
cient in fx;yg and envy-free, but we have to choose either the eﬃcient
allocation or the envy-free allocation. The same kind of conﬂict also
arises between Pareto eﬃciency and egalitarian-equivalence, as shown
by Tadenuma (2005).
If two criteria of decision-making are incompatible simultaneously,
we have to give priority to one criterion. That is, we take one criterion
as the ﬁrst and the other as the second, and apply them in the lexico-
graphic order. This paper formalizes the idea in a standard framework
of social choice correspondences in economic environments. Given the
ﬁrst and the second criterion, we require that choice should always be
made from the allocations satisfying the ﬁrst criterion whenever there
are any. The second criterion should then be applied when the ﬁrst
criterion is not at all eﬀective as a guide for selection, namely, either
when all the available allocations satisfy the ﬁrst criterion or when
there is no such allocation at all. A stronger version of this condition
may be obtained by requiring that all the allocations satisfying the
second criterion should be selected in the latter case.
Besides the socially desirable properties of selected allocations, an-
other important requirement for social choice correspondences is choice-
consistency. Especially, Path Independence is crucial. It implies “the
independence of the ﬁnal choice from the path to it” (Arrow, 1963, p.
120). Path independence is an indispensable property of social choice
rules. Were it violated, some arbitrary agenda controls could aﬀect the
ﬁnal choice, which is clearly undesirable.
Another natural choice-consistency condition, which is weaker than
Path Independence, is Contraction Consistency. This says that if an
allocation is chosen from a set S of available allocations, then it should
also be chosen from any subset T of S as long as it is still available.
The purpose of this paper is to examine possibility of consistent
choices under the eﬃciency-ﬁrst and equity-second principle or the
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bility theorems on the existence of social choice correspondences satis-
fying the eﬃciency-ﬁrst and equity-second principle with the concepts
of no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence, and Contraction Consistency.
However, if we restrict the range of reference bundles for egalitarian-
equivalence to a ﬁxed ray from the origin, then there exists a social
choice correspondence satisfying the eﬃciency-ﬁrst and equity-second-
as-egalitarian-equivalence principle and Path Independence. But even
for this case, the stronger versions of properties representing the prin-
ciple is incompatible with Path Independence.
Turning to the equity-ﬁrst and eﬃciency-second principle, we also
obtain impossibility and possibility results on the existence of social
choice correspondences satisfying the principle and choice-consistency
properties. It turns out that the borderline between possibility and im-
possibility is quite subtle. If our equity criterion selects only allocations
with no-envy at all, then there exists a social choice correspondence sat-
isfying the equity-ﬁrst principle and Path Independence. Moreover, we
obtain a characterization of the social choice correspondence by using
the stronger versions of properties representing the principle and Path
Independence. However, if we select allocations with “minimal-envy”
according to the measure of envy-instances introduced by Suzumura
(1996), which is based on the set-inclusions of envy relations, then
no social choice correspondence satisﬁes the equity-ﬁrst principle and
Contraction Consistency together. In contrast, if the equity criterion
selects allocations with “least-envy” in the sense that the number of
envy-instances is the smallest (Feldman and Kirman, 1974), then com-
patibility with Path Independence is retained.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes basic
concepts and notation, and Section 3 introduces various properties of
social choice correspondences that represent the eﬃciency ﬁrst princi-
ple or the equity ﬁrst principle, and choice-consistency. In Section 4, we
review the fundamental conﬂict between eﬃciency and equity. Section
5 examines choice-consistency of the social choice correspondences sat-
isfying the eﬃciency ﬁrst principle, and Section 6 turns to the equity
ﬁrst principle. In Section 7, we study the equity ﬁrst principle with the
notion of minimal-envy. Section 8 contains concluding remarks.
2 Basic Deﬁnitions and Notation
The framework and several fundamental results are due to Tadenuma
(1998). There are n agents and m inﬁnitely divisible goods, where n
and m are some integers with n;m ¸ 2. Let N = f1;¢¢¢ ;ng be the4 Koichi Tadenuma
set of agents. Denoting by R the set of real numbers, the set Rm
+ is
the consumption set of each agent. Let R be the class of preference
relations on Rm
+ that are reﬂexive, transitive, complete, continuous, and
monotonic. Each agent i 2 N is endowed with a preference relation
Ri 2 R. The strict preference relation and the indiﬀerence relation
of agent i are denoted by Pi and Ii, respectively. A list of preference
relations, (Ri)i2N 2 Rn, is called a preference proﬁle, and denoted by
RN.
An allocation is a vector x = (x1;¢¢¢ ;xn) 2 Rmn
+ where each xi =
(xi1;¢¢¢ ;xim) 2 Rm
+ is a consumption bundle of agent i 2 N. The set
of all allocations is denoted by X. We set X = Rmn
+ for simplicity
of presentation. However, we might impose a resource constraint on
X. For example, given a total amount of resources ­ 2 Rm
+, deﬁne
the set of all feasible allocations with no free disposal as X := fx 2
Rmn
+ j
Pn
i=1 xi = ­g. All the results in this paper hold on this more
restricted set of allocations. Let S be the set of all non-empty ﬁnite
subsets of X.
Let a preference proﬁle RN 2 Rn be given. An allocation x 2 X
is weakly Pareto superior to an allocation y 2 X for RN if xi Ri yi
for all i 2 N. We write x %P(RN) y if x is weakly Pareto superior to
y. Let ÂP(RN) be the strict part of %P(RN).1 An allocation x 2 X is
Pareto superior to an allocation y 2 X for RN if x ÂP(RN) y. For each
S 2 S, an allocation x 2 S is Pareto eﬃcient in S for RN if there is
no allocation y 2 S such that y ÂP(RN) x. Let P(RN;S) be the set of
Pareto eﬃcient allocations in S for RN.
An allocation x 2 X is envy-free for RN if xi Ri xj for all i;j 2 N.
For each S 2 S, let F(RN;S) be the set of envy-free allocations in S
for RN. An allocation x 2 X is egalitarian-equivalent for RN if there
is a consumption bundle x0 2 Rm
+ such that for all i 2 N, xi Ii x0.
Then, the bundle x0 is called a reference bundle for x. For each S 2 S,
let E(RN;S) be the set of egalitarian-equivalent allocations in S for
RN. Particular subclasses of egalitarian-equivalent allocations are often
studied in the literature. Let ¯ r 2 Rm
++ be a given vector. An allocation
x 2 X is egalitarian-equivalent for a ﬁxed reference ray with ¯ r for RN
or simply ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent for RN if there is a real number t 2 R
such that for all i 2 N, xi Ii t¯ r. For each S 2 S, let E¯ r(RN;S) be the
set of ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent allocations in S for RN.
A social choice correspondence is a set-valued function ' : Rn£S !
S such that '(RN;S) µ S for all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S. A social choice
1 Given a binary relation %, its strict part Â is deﬁned as x Â y , x % y and
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correspondence is interpreted as follows. Each S 2 S is interpreted as
the set of allocations available, which may be termed an environment
following (Arrow, 1963, p. 15). Then '(RN;S) is the set of socially
desirable allocations in the given environment S when the preferences
of the agents are RN. A fundamental example of a social choice corre-
spondence is the Pareto correspondence, denoted by P, which associates
with each (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S the set of all Pareto eﬃcient allocations
in S for RN. The No-Envy correspondence, the Egalitarian-Equivalence
correspondence, and the ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence correspondence, de-
noted by F;E, and E¯ r, respectively, can be deﬁned analogously.
A remark should be in order on the domain of social choice corre-
spondences. The domain consists of the preferences domain R and the
alternatives domain S. As in many contributions in the literature of so-
cial choice theory, we assume that S is the class of all ﬁnite subsets of
X. Our major interest here is not in investigating what are “optimal”
allocations in the set of all technologically feasible allocations. There
are many situations in which only a ﬁnite number of policy options are
at issue at any one time. In such situations, we are rather interested in
examining “consistency” of social choices at diﬀerent times, or under
expansions, contractions, or partitions of alternatives available at hand.
To that end, our choice of S would be appropriate.
3 The Axioms
This section introduces a variety of desirable properties of social choice
correspondences, which we call “axioms”. In the rest of the paper, we
denote by ' a social choice correspondence.
The ﬁrst axiom is familiar. It means that we should always select
from Pareto eﬃcient allocations whenever they exist.2
Pareto Eﬃciency. For all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S, if P(RN;S) 6= ;, then
'(RN;S) µ P(RN;S).
The next three axioms require that only equitable allocations should
be chosen whenever there are any.
No-Envy. For all (RN;S) 2 Rn£S, if F(RN;S) 6= ;, then '(RN;S) µ
F(RN;S).
2 Note that, in our present model, there always exists a Pareto eﬃcient allocation in
S 2 S since S is ﬁnite. To keep symmetry in the deﬁnitions of axioms concerning
eﬃciency and equity, and to present a deﬁnition which may be applicable to
other contexts where there may not exist Pareto eﬃcient allocations, we include
the condition that P(RN;S) 6= ; in the deﬁnition of this axiom.6 Koichi Tadenuma
Egalitarian-Equivalence: For all (RN;S) 2 Rn£S, if E(RN;S) 6= ;,
then '(RN;S) µ E(RN;S).
¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence: For all (RN;S) 2 Rn£S, if E¯ r(RN;S) 6=
;, then '(RN;S) µ E¯ r(RN;S).
Even if the eﬃciency criterion is taken as the ﬁrst principle for social
choice, equity criteria should be used when the eﬃciency criterion is
not at all eﬀective as a guide for selection: either when all the available
allocations are eﬃcient or when no available allocation is so.
P-Conditional No-Envy3 : For all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S, if (i)
P(RN;S) = S or P(RN;S) = ;, and (ii) F(RN;S) 6= ;, then
'(RN;S) µ F(RN;S).
The next axiom strengthens P-Conditional No-Envy. It means that
if either all the available allocations are eﬃcient or no available allo-
cation is eﬃcient, then all the envy-free allocations should be recom-
mended. In other words, it claims that we should not discriminate be-
tween allocations that equally satisfy the eﬃciency and equity criteria
deﬁned explicitly as axioms.4
P-Conditional No-Envy Inclusion: For all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S, if
(i) P(RN;S) = S or P(RN;S) = ;, and (ii) F(RN;S) 6= ;, then
'(RN;S) = F(RN;S).
By simply replacing the correspondence F with each of the cor-
respondences E and E¯ r in the above deﬁnitions, we deﬁne P-
Conditional Egalitarian-Equivalence and P-Conditional ¯ r-
Egalitarian-Equivalence, respectively, and their corresponding
stronger versions.
Turnig now to the equity-ﬁrst and eﬃciency-second principle, we
deﬁne the counterparts of the above axioms. Let a social choice corre-
spondence ª 2 fF;E;E¯ rg be given. (The correspondence ª is one of
3 The capital letter P stands for the Pareto correspondence.
4 The issue of whether we should take the stronger version of conditional equity or
eﬃciency may be related with the issue of full versus partial implementation of
social choice correspondences. Thomson (1996) made an argument in support of
full implementation as follows: “one should make sure that the complete list of
desired properties of correspondences have been identiﬁed, and then identify the
class of correspondences satisfying them. If all the properties are satisﬁed only by
F (that is, if F is characterized by these properties), then full implementation of
F is indeed what we should be after.” (p. 135)Choice-Consistent Resolutions of the Eﬃciency-Equity Trade-Oﬀ 7
the three “equity correspondences”.) If the equity criterion described
by ª is accepted as the ﬁrst selection principle, we may still apply the
eﬃciency criterion when all the allocations available are equitable, or
when there is no equitable allocation at all.
ª-Conditional Pareto Eﬃciency: For all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S, if
(i) ª(RN;S) = S or ª(RN;S) = ;, and (ii) P(RN;S) 6= ;, then
'(RN;S) µ P(RN;S).
As an example, when ª = F, we write the above axiom F-Conditional
Pareto Eﬃciency.5 A strengthening of ª-Conditional Pareto Eﬃ-
ciency is the following.
ª-Conditional Pareto Inclusion: For all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S, if
(i) ª(RN;S) = S or ª(RN;S) = ;, and (ii) P(RN;S) 6= ;, then
'(RN;S) = P(RN;S).
Next, we introduce several choice-consistency axioms. The ﬁrst one
is called Path Independence, which is due to Arrow (1963) and Plott
(1973), and may be described as follows. Let S be the set of available
allocations, and fS1;S2g be a partition of S. Suppose that we ﬁrst
choose desirable allocations '(Si) from each Si(i = 1;2), and next make
the ﬁnal choice from '(S1) [ '(S2), that is, from the “winners” of the
ﬁrst round. Then, Path Independence requires that for all partitions
of S, the ﬁnal choice should be the same, and hence the choice be
independent of the way how to partition S. Therefore, path independent
social choice rules are immune to any agenda control.
Path Independence: For all RN 2 Rn, and all S1;S2 2 S, '(RN;S1[
S2) = '(RN;'(RN;S1) [ '(RN;S2)).
Path Independence implies the following choice-consistency condi-
tion, which was introduced by Chernoﬀ (1954). Its intuitive meaning
is also clear: Suppose that an allocation x is chosen from a set S1, and
then the set of available alternatives is contracted to S2 ½ S1, but the
allocation x is still available. Then, this allocation should be selected
from the set S2 as well.
Contraction Consistency: For all RN 2 Rn and all S1;S2 2 S with
S2 µ S1, S2 \ '(S1) µ '(S2).
5 The capital letter F stands for Freedom from envy.8 Koichi Tadenuma
Ever since Arrow (1951), it has been a central issue in social choice
theory whether social choice correspondences are rationalizable, that
is, the choice described by the social choice correspondence from each
set of available alternatives could be obtained by maximization of some
“well-behaved” social preference relation. The question itself is of much
theoretical interest, and moreover it is worth examining because various
rationalizability conditions are logically related to choice-consistency
conditions.
Let Â be an irreﬂexive and asymmetric binary relation on X, the
interpretation of which is a strict social preference relation.6 For each
S 2 S, denote by MÂ(S) the set of maximal elements of Â in S, that
is,
MÂ(S) := fx 2 S j There exists no y 2 S such that y Â xg
Quasi-Transitive Rationalizability:7 For every RN 2 Rn, there
exists an irreﬂexive, asymmetric, and transitive binary relation Â(RN)
on X such that for all S 2 S, '(RN;S) = MÂ(RN)(S).
We say that a binary relation Â has a cycle if there exist a positive
integer K and K allocations x1;¢¢¢ ;xK such that xk Â xk+1 for all k
with 1 · k · K ¡ 1, and xK Â x1. The binary relation Â is acyclic if
it has no cycle.8
Acyclic Rationalizability: For every RN 2 Rn, there exists an
acyclic binary relation Â(RN) on X such that for all S 2 S, '(RN;S) =
MÂ(RN)(S).
The conditions introduced above have the following logical rela-
tions.9 Quasi-Transitive Rationalizability implies both Acyclic Ratio-
nalizability and Path Independence, and each of the two conditions,
Acyclic Rationalizability and Path Independence, implies Contraction
Consistency. The converse of each statement does not hold true. Hence,
6 It will be convenient for us to present the results by strict social preference re-
lations Â. However, we could alternatively use the reﬂexive and complete social
preference relations % induced from Â as follows: For all x;y 2 X, x % y if and
only if y Â x does not hold.
7 The term “quasi-transitivity” is due to Sen (1970), which means transitivity of
strict social preference relations.
8 Note that if Â is acyclic, then by deﬁnition, it is irreﬂexive and asymmetric.
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Contraction Consistency may be considered as the minimal require-
ment of choice-consistency of social choice correspondences. It is also a
necessary condition for any kind of rationalizability by a single binary
relation, but it is not a suﬃcient condition even for Acyclic Rational-
izability.10
Figure 1 summarizes the logical relations between the axioms. Each
arrow indicates the direction of logical implication.
Quasi-Transitive Rationalizability =) Acyclic Rationalizability
+ +
Path Independence =) Contraction Consistency
Figure 1: Logical relations of choice-consistency and
rationalizability conditions
Our ﬁnal axiom is an obvious requirement: Social choice rules should
be able to select some allocations for any environment.
Non-Emptiness: For all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S, '(RN;S) 6= ;.
4 Conﬂicts between Eﬃciency and Equity
This section reviews the fundamental conﬂict between the Pareto eﬃ-
ciency criterion and the equity criteria. First, we observe the conﬂict
between eﬃciency and no-envy, which was ﬁrst pointed out by Kolm
(1972).
Example 1 There are two agents N = f1;2g and two goods f1;2g.
The preferences of the agents are represented by the utility functions
u1(x11;x12) = x11x12
u2(x21;x22) = 2x21 + x22
10 As a counter-example for the last claim, consider the social choice correspondence
deﬁned as follows: Choose x
0 2 X. Deﬁne the correspondence C by
C(S) = fx
0g if x
0 2 S and jSj ¸ 3;
C(S) = S otherwise.
It can be checked that the correspondence C satisﬁes Contraction Consistency,
but cannot be rationalized by any social preference relation.10 Koichi Tadenuma
Let x = (x1;x2) = ((1; 46
5 );(9; 4
5)) and y = (y1;y2) = ((11
5 ; 22
5 );(39
5 ; 28
5 ).
Then, since u1(y1) > u1(x1) and u2(y2) > u2(x2), the allocation y is
Pareto superior to the allocation x. However, x is envy-free because
u1(x1) > u1(x2) and u2(x2) > u2(x1), whereas y is not since u1(y2) >
u1(y1). Now let S = fx;yg. Then, both the sets P(RN;S) and F(RN;S)
are non-empty, but the intersection of the two sets is empty.
This example can be extended to the case of any ﬁnite numbers of
agents and goods. Hence, we have the following impossibility.
Theorem 1. [Kolm (1972), Feldman and Kirman (1974), Suzumura
(1981a)] There exists no social choice correspondence that satisﬁes
Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, and No-Envy.
Next we show that the same kind of conﬂict may also arise between
the Pareto eﬃciency criterion and the equity-as-egalitarian-equivalence
criterion.
Example 2 There are two agents N = f1;2g and two goods 1;2. The
preferences of the agents are represented by the utility functions11
u1(x11;x12) = minfx11;x12g
u2(x21;x22) = x21 + 3x22
Let x = (x1;x2) = ((3;11);(9;1)) and y = (y1;y2) = ((8;8);(4;4)).
Let ¯ r = (1;1). Then, the allocation y is Pareto superior to the al-
location x. On the other hand, since u1(x1) = 3 = u1(3¯ r) and
u2(x2) = 12 = u2(3¯ r), the allocation x is ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent with
3¯ r being the reference bundle. However, y is not egalitarian-equivalent
because for any bundle z0 such that u1(z0) = u1(y1), z0 ¸ (8;8) and
hence u2(z0) ¸ u2(8;8) > u2(4;4) = u2(y2). Let S = fx;yg. Then, both
the sets P(RN;S) and E(RN;S) = E¯ r(RN;S) are non-empty, but the
intersection of the two sets is empty.
Theorem 2. [Tadenuma (2005)] (i) There exists no social choice
correspondence that satisﬁes Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, and
Egalitarian-Equivalence. (ii) There exists no social choice corre-
spondence that satisﬁes Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, and ¯ r-
Egalitarian-Equivalence.
11 We use Leontief preferences only for easy calculations. An example can be con-
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5 The Eﬃciency-First Principle
The results in the previous section show that we cannot always select an
allocation that is both Pareto eﬃcient and equitable. Therefore, in cases
where the two criteria are conﬂicting with each other, we have to give
priority to one of them. In this section, we adopt the eﬃciency criterion
as the ﬁrst principle, keeping the requirement of Pareto Eﬃciency on
social choice correspondences. As for equity criteria, however, we only
require their conditional versions.
By the deﬁnitions of axioms, Pareto Eﬃciency and P-Conditional
No-Envy (or P-Conditional Egalitarian-Equivalence, P-Conditional ¯ r-
Egalitarian-Equivalence) together are compatible with Non-Emptiness.
We examine with which choice-consistency conditions these axioms are
compatible. In order to present the results, we introduce several social
preference relations.
5.1 No-Envy as the Second Criterion
Let RN 2 Rn be given. We deﬁne the equity-as-no-envy superior re-
lation, denoted ÂF(RN), as follows: For all x;y 2 X, x ÂF(RN) y if
and only if x is envy-free and y is not. Recall that ÂP(RN) denotes the
Pareto superior relation.
Given RN 2 Rn, deﬁne the binary relation ÂPF(RN) on X as follows:
For all x;y 2 X, x ÂPF(RN) y if and only if (i) x ÂP(RN) y or (ii)
x 6ÂP(RN) y, y 6ÂP(RN) x, and x ÂF(RN) y.
Under the social preference relation ÂPF(RN), we ﬁrst apply the
Pareto criterion when we rank any two allocations. Then, only when
the Pareto criterion does not give a strict ranking between the two, we
apply the equity-as-no-envy criterion.
The next lemma clariﬁes the relation between the social choice cor-
respondences satisfying Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional No-Envy, and
Contraction Consistency, and the social preference relation ÂPF(RN).
Lemma 1. If a social choice correspondence ' satisﬁes Pareto Eﬃ-
ciency, P-Conditional No-Envy, and Contraction Consistency, then
'(RN;S) µ MÂPF(RN)(S) for all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S.
Proof. Suppose that a social choice correspondence ' satisﬁes Pareto
Eﬃciency, P-Conditional No-Envy, and Contraction Consistency. Let
(RN;S) 2 Rn £S be given. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists
x 2 S such that x 2 '(RN;S) but x = 2 MÂPF(RN)(S). Then, there exists
y 2 S such that y ÂPF(RN) x. Because x 2 '(RN;S) µ P(RN;S)12 Koichi Tadenuma
by Pareto Eﬃciency, y 6ÂP(RN) x. Hence, y ÂPF(RN) x holds only if
x 6ÂP(RN) y and y ÂF(RN) x. Let S0 = fx;yg. Then, S0 µ S and
P(RN;S0) = S0. By P-Conditional No-Envy, '(RN;S0) µ F(RN;S0).
Thus, x = 2 '(RN;S0). This means, however, that ' violates Contraction
Consistency, which is a contradiction. u t
It is well-known that for any binary relation Â, the set MÂ(S) is
non-empty for all S 2 S if and only if Â is acyclic (Sen, 1970). Hence, it
follows from the above lemma that there exist social choice correspon-
dences satisfying the three axioms and Non-Emptiness only if ÂPF(RN)
is acyclic. Unfortunately, the social preference relation ÂPF(RN) may
have a cycle.
Proposition 1. [Tadenuma (2002)]There exists a preference proﬁle
RN 2 Rn such that ÂPF(RN) has a cycle.
Proof. For simplicity of presentation, we consider a two-agent and two-
good economy. Similar examples can be constructed for the case of any
numbers of agents and goods. Let N = f1;2g be the set of agents.
Assume that agent i 2 N has the preference relation Ri on R2
+ that is
represented by the following utility function:
u1(x11;x12) = x11x12
u2(x21;x22) = 2x21 + x22
Deﬁne four allocations x;y;z and w by x = ((1;9);(9;1)), y =
((3;6);(7;4)), z = ((2;8);(8;2)); and w = ((2;7);(8;3)). Then,
x ÂPF(RN) y since x 6ÂP(RN) y, y 6ÂP(RN) x, and x ÂF(RN) y. Since
y ÂP(RN) z, we have y ÂPF(RN) z. Because z 6ÂP(RN) w, w 6ÂP(RN) z,
and z ÂF(RN) w, we have z ÂPF(RN) w. Finally, w ÂPF(RN) x follows
from the fact that w ÂP(RN) x. Thus, the relation ÂPF(RN) has a cycle.
From Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, the next impossibility theorem
follows.
Theorem 3. There exists no social choice correspondence that satisﬁes
Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional No-Envy, and Con-
traction Consistency.
We have argued that Path Independence is an indispensable prop-
erty of social choice correspondences. However, since Path Indepen-
dence implies Contraction Consistency, we have the following impossi-
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Corollary 1. There exists no social choice correspondence that satis-
ﬁes Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional No-Envy, and
Path Independence.
5.2 Egalitarian-Equivalence as the Second Criterion
Next, we adopt egalitarian-equivalence as the concept of equity instead
of no-envy. The analyses will go parallel to those in the previous subsec-
tion. We deﬁne the equity-as-egalitarian-equivalence superior relation
ÂE(RN) as x ÂE(RN) y if and only if x is egalitarian-equivalent and y
is not. Then, deﬁne the binary relation ÂPE(RN) on X as x ÂPE(RN) y
if and only if (i) x ÂP(RN) y or (ii) x 6ÂP(RN) y, y 6ÂP(RN) x, and
x ÂE(RN) y.
Just like Lemma 1, we can show that if a social choice corre-
spondence ' satisﬁes Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional Egalitarian-
Equivalence, and Contraction Consistency, then '(RN;S) µ
MÂPE(RN)(S) for all (RN;S) 2 Rn£S. Hence, whether the social pref-
erence relation ÂPE(RN) is acyclic or not is a crucial question for the
existence of social choice correspondence satisfying the three axioms
and Non-Emptiness. However, ÂPE(RN) may have a cycle.
Proposition 2. [Tadenuma (2005)]. There exists a preference proﬁle
RN 2 Rn such that ÂPE(RN) has a cycle.
Proof. For simplicity of presentation, we consider a two-agent and two-
good economy. Let N = f1;2g be the set of agents. Assume that agent
1’s preference relation R1 on R2
+ is represented by a Leontief utility
function:
u1(x11;x12) = minfx11;x12g
Agent 2’s preference relation R2 is represented by the following piece-
wise linear utility function:
u2(x21;x22) = x21 + 20 if x22 ¸ x21 and x22 ¸ 20
u2(x21;x22) = x21 + x22 if x22 ¸ x21 and x22 · 20
u2(x21;x22) = 2x22 if x22 · x21
Deﬁne four allocations x;y;z and w by x = ((18;9);(10;19));y =
((12;10);(16;18));z = ((23;11);(5;17)) and w = ((17;15);(11;13)).
Then, observe the following facts: (1) y ÂP(RN) x. (2) w ÂP(RN) z.
(3) y 6ÂP(RN) z and z 6ÂP(RN) y. (4) x 6ÂP(RN) w and w 6ÂP(RN) x.
(5) x is egalitarian-equivalent with a reference bundle (9;20) since14 Koichi Tadenuma
u1(x1) = 9 = u1(9;20) and u2(x2) = 29 = u2(9;20). (6) z is egalitarian-
equivalent with a reference bundle (11;11). (7) y is not egalitarian-
equivalent because for all a0 2 R2
+ such that u2(a0) = u2(y2) = 34,
a0 ¸ (13;13), and hence u1(a0) ¸ u1(13;13) = 13 > 10 = u1(y1).
(8) w is not egalitarian-equivalent since for all b0 2 R2
+ such that
u1(b0) = u1(w1) = 15, b0 ¸ (15;15), and thus u2(b0) ¸ u2(15;15) =
30 > 24 = u2(w2).
By (1), we have y ÂPE(RN) x. It follows from (3), (6) and (7) that
z ÂPE(RN) y. By (2), w ÂPE(RN) z. Finally, from (4), (5) and (8)
together, we have x ÂPE(RN) w. Thus, the relation ÂPE(RN) has a
cycle. u t
By Proposition 2, we have the following impossibility results.
Theorem 4. There exists no social choice correspondence that sat-
isﬁes Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional Egalitarian-
Equivalence, and Contraction Consistency.
Corollary 2. There exists no social choice correspondence that sat-
isﬁes Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional Egalitarian-
Equivalence, and Path Independence.
5.3 ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence as the Second Criterion
We have reached an impossibility again with egalitarian-equivalence
as the second criterion. In this subsection, we adopt a more restricted
concept of equity than egalitarian-equivalence, namely ¯ r-egalitarian-
equivalence. Let us recall that the reference bundles of ¯ r-egalitarian-
equivalent allocations must lie in the given ray from the origin, while
there is no such restriction in the deﬁnition of (general) egalitarian-
equivalent allocations. With ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalence as the second cri-
terion, we have a positive result as shown next.
Theorem 5. There exists a social choice correspondence that satis-
ﬁes Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-
Equivalence and Path Independence.
Proof. The proof relies on the social preference relation introduced by
Pazner and Schmeidler (1978). For each RN 2 Rn, deﬁne a binary
relation %PS(RN) on Rmn
+ as follows. For all x;y 2 X, x %PS(RN) y if
and only if
min
i2N
minf¸i 2 R j ¸i¯ r Ri xig ¸ min
i2N
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Let ÂPS(RN) be the strict part of %PS(RN). Deﬁne the social choice
function 'PS by 'PS(RN;S) = MÂPS(RN)(S) for all (RN;S) 2 Rn£S.
It is easy to check that 'PS satisﬁes Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency,
and P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence. Since %PS(RN) is transi-
tive and complete, and transitive rationalizability implies Path Inde-
pendence, it follows that 'PS satiﬁes Path Independence. u t
We argued that if explicitly deﬁned criteria of eﬃciency and equity
should be the only selection principles, then the stronger version of
conditional eﬃciency and equity should be accepted. That is, if the
ﬁrst principle selects all or none, then the allocations satisfying the
second principle should be all taken, and no discrimination between
them should be introduced. Next we examine the compatibility of this
stronger version with choice-consistency.
We deﬁne the equity-as-¯ r-egalitarian-equivalence superior relation
ÂE¯ r(RN) as x ÂE¯ r(RN) y if and only if x is ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent and
y is not.
Theorem 6. There exists a social choice correspondence that satis-
ﬁes Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-
Equivalence Inclusion, E¯ r-Conditional Pareto Inclusion, and Contrac-
tion Consistency.
Proof. For each RN 2 Rn, deﬁne the binary relation ÂPE¯ r(RN) as fol-
lows. For all x;y 2 X, x ÂPE¯ r(RN) y if and only if (i) x ÂP(RN) y
or (ii) x 6ÂP(RN) y, y 6ÂP(RN) x, and x ÂE¯ r(RN) y. Deﬁne the so-
cial choice correspondence 'PE¯ r by 'PE¯ r(RN;S) = MÂPE¯ r(RN)(S)
for all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S. By Tadenuma (2005, Prop. 5), ÂPE¯ r(RN)
is acyclic, and hence 'PE¯ r satisﬁes Non-Emptiness. It is clear that
'PE¯ r satisﬁes Pareto Eﬃciency. To check that it satisﬁes P-Conditional
¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence Inclusion, let (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S be such
that P(RN;S) = S. Clearly, 'PE¯ r(S) µ E¯ r(RN;S). Suppose that
there exists x 2 E¯ r(RN;S) such that x = 2 'PE¯ r. Then, there is
y 2 S with y ÂPE¯ r(RN) x. Since x;y 2 P(RN;S), y cannot be
Pareto superior to x. Because x 2 E¯ r(RN;S), y cannot be equity-
as-¯ r-egalitarian-equivalence superior to x, either. This is a contradic-
tion. Hence, E¯ r(RN;S) µ 'PE¯ r(S). Similarly, we can show that 'PE¯ r
satisﬁes E¯ r-Conditional Pareto Inclusion. Finally, since 'PE¯ r(RN;¢) is
rationalizable by the binary relation ÂPE¯ r(RN), it satisﬁes Contraction
Consistency. u t
However, if we strengthens the requirement of choice-consistency,
we have another impossibility.16 Koichi Tadenuma
Theorem 7. There exists no social choice correspondence that satis-
ﬁes Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-
Equivalence, E¯ r-Conditional Pareto Inclusion, and Path Independence.
Proof. Consider the economy deﬁned in the proof of Proposition
2. Let ¯ r = (9;20). Deﬁne three allocations x;y and w by x =
((18;9);(10;19));y = ((12;10);(16;18)) and w = ((17;15);(11;13)).
Then, the allocation x is ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent, but the other two
allocations are not. On the other hand, y ÂP(RN) x, but y 6ÂP(RN) w
and w 6ÂP(RN) y. Similarly, x 6ÂP(RN) w and w 6ÂP(RN) x.
Suppose that there exists a social choice correspondence ' that sat-
isﬁes Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence, E¯ r-
Conditional Pareto Inclusion, Path Independence and Non-Emptiness.
It follows from Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-
Equivalence, and Path Independence (which implies Contraction Con-
sistency) that '(RN;S) µ MÂPE¯ r(RN)(S) for all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S.
Let S1 = fx;y;wg, S2 = fx;yg and S3 = fwg. Then,
MÂPE¯ r(RN)(S1) = fyg and MÂPE¯ r(RN)(S2) = fyg. By the above re-
lation and Non-Emptiness of ', we have
'(RN;S1) = fyg and '(RN;S2) = fyg (1)
By Non-Emptiness, '(RN;S3) = fwg. Hence,
'(RN;'(RN;S2) [ '(RN;S3)) = '(RN;fy;wg) (2)
Observe that E¯ r(RN;fy;wg) = ; and P(RN;fy;wg) = fy;wg. Since '
satisﬁes E¯ r-Conditional Pareto Inclusion, we have
'(RN;fy;wg) = fy;wg (3)
It follows from (1), (2) and (3) that '(RN;'(RN;S2) [ '(RN;S3)) 6=
'(RN;S1). This means that ' violates Path Independence, which is a
contradiction. u t
6 The Equity-First Principle
In this section, we reverse the order of application of the eﬃciency
and equity criteria. That is, we ﬁrst select from equitable allocations,
and if the equity criterion is not eﬀective as a guide for selection ei-
ther because all the available allocations are equitable or because no
allocation is equitable, then we choose from eﬃcient allocations. In
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essentially the same results hold true with egalitarian-equivalence or
¯ r-egalitarian-equivalence.
To identify the social choice correspondences satisfying No-Envy, F-
Conditional Pareto Eﬃciency and Contraction Consistency, it is useful
to introduce a social preference relation. Given RN 2 Rn, deﬁne the
binary relation ÂFP(RN) on X as follows: For all x;y 2 X, x ÂFP(RN) y
if and only if (i) x ÂF(RN) y for RN, or (ii) x 6ÂF(RN) y, y 6ÂF(RN) x,
and x ÂP(RN) y. Under this social preference relation, we ﬁrst apply
the equity-as-no-envy criterion to rank any two allocations, and when
the two allocations are not strictly ranked by the criterion because both
are envy-free or neither is, we invoke the eﬃciency criterion.
The next lemma is the counterpart of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. If a social choice correspondence ' satisﬁes No-Envy,
F-Conditional Pareto Eﬃciency, and Contraction Consistency, then
'(RN;S) µ MÂFP(RN)(S) for all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S.
Proof. Suppose that a social choice correspondence ' satisﬁes No-
Envy, F-Conditional Pareto Eﬃciency, and Contraction Consistency.
Let (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S be given. Suppose, on the contrary, that there
exists x 2 S such that x 2 '(RN;S) but x = 2 MÂFP(RN)(S). Then,
there exists y 2 S such that y ÂFP(RN) x. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: F(RN;S) 6= ;.
Because x 2 '(RN;S) µ F(RN;S) by No-Envy, y ÂFP(RN) x holds
only if both x and y are envy-free, and y is Pareto superior to x. Let
S0 = fx;yg. Then, S0 µ S, and F(RN;S0) = S0. By F-Conditional
Pareto Eﬃciency, '(RN;S0) µ P(RN;S0) = fyg. Thus, x = 2 '(RN;S0).
This means that ' violates Contraction Consistency, which is a contra-
diction.
Case 2: F(RN;S) = ;.
Then, y ÂFP(RN) x holds only if y is Pareto superior to x. Let S0 =
fx;yg. Then, S0 µ S, and F(RN;S0) = ;. By F-Conditional Pareto
Eﬃciency, '(RN;S0) µ P(RN;S0) = fyg. The rest of the argument is
the same as Case 1. u t
The next result should be contrasted with Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. For all RN 2 Rn, ÂFP(RN) is transitive.
Proof. Let RN 2 Rn be given. To lighten notation, we simply write
ÂFP, ÂP, and F for ÂFP(RN), ÂP(RN), and F(RN;X), respectively.
Assume that x ÂFP y and y ÂFP z. By x ÂFP y, (1) x 2 F and y = 2 F
or (2) [[x 2 F and y 2 F] or [x = 2 F and y = 2 F]] and x ÂP y. By y ÂFP18 Koichi Tadenuma
z, (3) y 2 F and z = 2 F or (4) [[y 2 F and z 2 F] or [y = 2 F and z = 2 F]]
and y ÂP z. (1) and (3) are incompatible. If (1) and (4) hold, then we
must have x 2 F and z = 2 F. Hence, x ÂFP z. Similarly, if (2) and
(3) hold, then x 2 F but z = 2 F, and we have x ÂFP z. If (2) and
(4) hold, then either x;y;z 2 F and x ÂP y ÂP z or x;y;z = 2 F and
x ÂP y ÂP z. Since the relation ÂP is transitive, we have x ÂFP z. u t
Deﬁne the social choice correspondence 'FP by
'FP(RN;S) = MÂFP(RN)(S) for all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S:
This correspondence takes the following values:
'FP(RN;S) = P(RN;F(RN;S)) if F(RN;S) 6= ;
'FP(RN;S) = P(RN;S) if F(RN;S) = ;
Note that for all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S, P(RN;F(RN;S)) ¶
P(RN;S) \ F(RN;S) and there exists (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S such that
P(RN;F(RN;S)) 6= P(RN;S) \ F(RN;S).
We next show that the social choice correspondence 'FP is char-
acterized by No-Envy, the stronger versions of conditional Pareto Eﬃ-
ciency and No-Envy, and Path Independence.
Theorem 8. A social choice correspondence ' satisﬁes Non-
Emptiness, No-Envy, P-Conditional No-Envy Inclusion, F-Conditional
Pareto Inclusion, and Path Independence if and only if ' = 'FP.
Proof. First, we show that 'FP satisﬁes the ﬁve axioms. It is easy
to check that 'FP satisﬁes No-Envy, F-Conditional Pareto Inclusion
and P-Conditional No-Envy Inclusion. By Proposition 3, 'FP satisﬁes
Quasi-Transitive Rationalizability, which implies Path Independence.
Since any quasi-transitive binary relation has maximal elements in any
ﬁnite set, Non-Emptiness follows.
Next we show that 'FP is the unique social choice correspondence
that satiﬁes the ﬁve axioms. Suppose, on the contrary, that there is
a social choice correspondence ' with ' 6= 'FP that satisﬁes the ﬁve
axioms. Then, there is (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S such that
'(RN;S) 6= 'FP(RN;S) (1)
If F(RN;S) = ;, then by F-Conditional Pareto Inclusion, '(RN;S) =
P(RN;S). On the other hand, it can be checked that 'FP(RN;S) =
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contradiction. Thus, F(RN;S) 6= ;. Since F-Conditional Pareto Inclu-
sion implies F-Conditional Pareto Eﬃciency, and Path Independence
implies Contraction Consistency, it follows from Lemma 2 that
'(RN;S) µ MÂFP(RN)(S) = 'FP(RN;S) (2)
Because F(RN;S) 6= ;, we have
MÂFP(RN)(S) = P(RN;F(RN;S)) (3)
It follows from (1), (2) and (3) that there exists x¤ 2 S such that x¤ 2
P(RN;F(RN;S)) but x¤ = 2 '(RN;S). Deﬁne S0 := fx¤g [ fy 2 S j y 2
F(RN;S) and x¤ ÂP(RN) yg[[SnF(RN;S)]. By Lemma 2, '(RN;S0) µ
MÂFP(RN)(S0) = fx¤g. By Non-Emptiness, we have '(RN;S0) = fx¤g.
Deﬁne S00 := SnS0. Again from Lemma 2, it follows that
'(RN;S00) µ MÂFP(RN)(S00) = P(RN;F(RN;S00)) (4)
Claim: P(RN;F(RN;S00)) ½ P(RN;F(RN;S)).
Let z 2 P(RN;F(RN;S00)). Then, z 2 F(RN;S00) ½ F(RN;S).
Suppose that z = 2 P(RN;F(RN;S)). Then, there exists w 2
P(RN;F(RN;S)) such that w ÂP(RN) z. If w = x¤, then z 2 S0
and hence z = 2 S00, which is a contradiction. Thus, w 6= x¤. But
then, w 2 S00 and so z = 2 P(RN;F(RN;S00)), which contradicts
z 2 P(RN;F(RN;S00)). Therefore, we must have z 2 P(RN;F(RN;S)).
Thus, the claim has been proved.
It follows from (4) and the above claim that '(RN;S00) µ
P(RN;F(RN;S)). Hence, '(RN;S0)['(RN;S00) = fx¤g['(RN;S00) µ
P(RN;F(RN;S)). Therefore, P(RN;'(RN;S0) [ '(RN;S00)) =
'(RN;S0) [ '(RN;S00). Then, by P-Conditional No-Envy Inclusion,
we conclude that '(RN;'(RN;S0) [ '(RN;S00)) = F(RN;'(RN;S0) [
'(RN;S00)) = '(RN;S0) [ '(RN;S00) = fx¤g [ '(RN;S00). But since
x¤ = 2 '(RN;S) = '(RN;S0[S00) and ' satisﬁes Path Independence, we
must have x¤ = 2 '(RN;'(RN;S0)['(RN;S00)). This is a contradiction.
Therefore, there is no social choice correspondence ' with ' 6= 'FP
that satisﬁes the ﬁve axioms together in the statement of the theorem.
u t
7 Minimal-Envy and Choice-Consistency
In the previous sections, our equity-as-no-envy criterion made only “all-
or-nothing” selection: an allocation is selected if there is no envy at20 Koichi Tadenuma
all, whereas it is not selected if there is at least one instance of envy.
However, among allocations with envy, the instances of envy may diﬀer
greatly. In such cases, it should be desirable to select allocations with
“minimal” instances of envy.
In this section, we introduce a measure of envy at allocations, which
is due to Suzumura (1996). Based on the measure, we deﬁne the notion
of minimal-envy. Then, as in the foregoing section, we examine the
choice-consistency properties of social choice correspondences satisfying
the eﬃciency ﬁrst or the equity ﬁrst principle with minimal-envy as the
concept of equity.
For each RN 2 Rn, and each x 2 X, deﬁne the set H(RN;x) ½
N £ N by
H(RN;x) = f(i;j) 2 N £ N j xj Pi xig
The set H(RN;x) is the set of all instances of envy at x. Following
Suzumura (1996), we deﬁne the binary relation. ÂFmin(RN) as follows:
for all x;y 2 X, x ÂFmin(RN) y if and only if H(RN;x) ( H(RN;y).
In a similar way to deﬁning Pareto eﬃciency, we can deﬁne the no-
tion of minimal-envy. Given (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S, an allocation x 2 S
is envy-minimal in S for RN if there is no allocation y 2 S such that
H(RN;y) ( H(RN;x). Let Fmin(RN;S) be the set of envy-minimal al-
locations in S for RN. By simply replacing F(RN;S) with Fmin(RN;S)
in the deﬁnitions of axioms in Section 3, we can deﬁne axioms, Minimal-
Envy, P-Conditional Minimal-Envy, and Fmin-Conditional Pareto Ef-
ﬁciency.
Reexamining the proofs of Lemma 1, Proposition 1 and Theorem
3, we ﬁnd that there is no social choice correspondence that satisﬁes
Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional Minimal-Envy and
Contraction Consistency. Moreover, with this concept of equity, even
the equity-ﬁrst principle may contradict the minimum requirement of
choice-consistency, which we now turn to.
For each RN 2 Rn, deﬁne the binary relation ÂFminP(RN) as fol-
lows: For all x;y 2 X, x ÂFminP(RN) y if and only if (i) x ÂFmin(RN) y,
or (ii) x 6ÂFmin(RN) y, y 6ÂFmin(RN) x, and x ÂP(RN) y. Then, as in
Lemma 2, we can show that if a social choice correspondence ' satis-
ﬁes Non-Emptiness, Minimal-Envy, Fmin-Conditional Pareto Eﬃciency
and Contraction Consistency, then '(RN;S) µ MÂFminP(RN)(S) for all
(RN;S) 2 Rn £ S.
Proposition 4. There exist a preference proﬁle RN 2 Rn such that
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Proof. Consider an economy with four agents and two goods. Let N =
f1;2;3;4g be the set of agents. Assume that the agents’ preference
relations are represented by the following utility functions:
u1(x11;x12) = x11x12
u3(x31;x32) = x31 + x32
and
u2 = u1 and u4 = u3:
Cosider the following three allocations, x;y and z:
(x1;x2;x3;x4) = ((6;0);(0;6);(3;3);(3;3))
(y1;y2;y3;y4) = ((0:5;1);(0:5;6);(8:5;0);(2:5;5))
(z1;z2;z3;z4) = ((1;1);(2;2);(5;4);(4;5))
Observe that
z ÂP(RN) y ÂP(RN) x
and
H(RN;x) = f(1;3);(1;4);(2;3);(2;4)g
H(RN;y) = f(1;4);(2;4);(1;2);(4;3)g
H(RN;z) = f(1;3);(1;4);(2;3);(2;4);(1;2)g:
Since H(RN;x) 6µ H(RN;y), H(RN;y) 6µ H(RN;x), and y ÂP(RN) x,
we have y ÂFminP(RN) x. Similarly, z ÂFminP(RN) y holds true. However,
it follows from H(RN;x) ( H(RN;z) that x ÂFminP(RN) z. Thus, there
is a cycle for ÂFminP(RN). u t
In a framework of abstract social choice, Suzumura (2004) deﬁnes
the binary relation %FSP(RN) as follows: For all x;y 2 X, x %FSP(RN) y
if and only if (i) H(RN;x) µ H(RN;y) or (ii) H(RN;x) 6µ H(RN;y),
H(RN;y) 6µ H(RN;x), and x %P y. Let ÂFSP(RN) be the strict part of
%FSP(RN). Suzumura (2004) presented an example such that %FSP(RN)
is acyclic but is not consistent. Let us recollect that a binary relation
% on X is consistent if for any integer k ¸ 3, there exists no ﬁnite set
fx1;x2;:::;xkg µ X such that x1 Â x2;x2 % x3;:::;xk¡1 % xk, and
xk % x1.
Notice that there is an important diﬀerence between the deﬁnitions
of ÂFminP(RN) and ÂFSP(RN). Just as all other lexicographic composi-
tions of two criteria studied in this paper and Tadenuma (2002, 2005),22 Koichi Tadenuma
the relation ÂFminP(RN) invokes the second criterion (the Pareto su-
perior relation in this case) when the ﬁrst criterion judges the two
alternatives to be indiﬀerent or non-comparable, and if there is a strict
ranking between the two by the second criterion, it is adopted. In con-
trast, the relation ÂFSP(RN) does not make any strict ranking when
the two alternatives are indiﬀerent for the ﬁrst criterion. For example,
if H(RN;x) = H(RN;y) and x ÂP(RN) y, then x ÂFminP(RN) y but
x 6ÂFSP(RN) y.
A motivation for our lexicographic composition of two binary re-
lations is that we should apply the second criterion to evaluate desir-
ability of two allocations whenever they are non-comparable or equally
good by the ﬁrst criterion, so that we could have a more ﬁne-grained
social ranking of allocations. If the set of pairs of envious and envied
agents is exactly the same for the two allocations, and one of them is
Pareto superior to the other, why do not we choose the former? Sim-
ilarly, if the two allocations give the same utility for every agent, and
one of them is more equitable than the other, then we should select the
more equitable.
In spite of this diﬀerence in the deﬁnitions, the proof of Proposi-
tion 4 actually shows that the relation ÂFSP(RN) also has a cycle for
the preference proﬁle because the proof does not depend on the case
where the set of instances of envy is exactly the same for the two al-
locations. Thus, Proposition 4 strengthens Suzumura’s result in two
respects. First, we show that the relation %FSP(RN) is not even acyclic.
Note that acyclicity is a weaker condition than consistency. Second, we
establish the result on the domain of classical exchange economies with
no free disposal of goods and continuous, convex and strictly monotonic
preferences. Even on this much restricted domain, we cannot avoid a
cycle of the strict part of %FSP(RN).
From Proposition 4, we obtain another impossibility theorem. The
proof is analogous to those for the previous results, and it is omitted.
Theorem 9. There exists no social choice correspondence that sat-
isﬁes Non-Emptiness, Minimal-Envy, Fmin-Conditional Pareto Eﬃ-
ciency and Contraction Consistency.
Feldman and Kirman (1974) introduced a diﬀerent measure of envy
at allocations, which simply counts the number of instances of envy.
Based on the measure, we may deﬁne the notion of the least envy.
For each (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S, we say that an allocation x 2 S has
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#H(RN;y) < #H(RN;x).12 Let Fleast(RN;S) be the set of allocations
that have the least envy in S. Then, we can similarly deﬁne axioms,
Least-Envy, P-Conditional Least-Envy, and Fleast-Conditional Pareto
Eﬃciency.
As in Theorems 3 and 8, we can show that (i) there exists no so-
cial choice correspondence that satisﬁes Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃ-
ciency, P-Conditional Least-Envy and Contraction Consistency; and
(ii) there exists a social choice correspondence that satisﬁes Non-
Emptiness, Least-Envy, Fleast-Conditional Pareto Eﬃciency and Path
Independence. The proofs are similar, and we omit them.
8 Concluding Remarks
In his two seminal papers, Suzumura (1981a, b) considered a class of
abstract social choice problems, and examined possibility of construct-
ing social choice correspondences satisfying the following conditions on
eﬃciency and equity.
Fairness Extension: For all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S, '(RN;S) =
P(RN;S) \ F(RN;S) if P(RN;S) \ F(RN;S) 6= ;.
This axiom requires that if there are Pareto eﬃcient and equitable
allocations, then they should be all selected.
Fairness Inclusion: For all (RN;S) 2 Rn £ S, if P(RN;S) \
F(RN;S) = ;, y 2 '(RN;S), and x 2 S is Pareto superior to y or
equity-as-no-envy superior to y for RN, then x 2 '(RN;S).
This means that if some allocation is selected, and there are alloca-
tions that are superior to the former either in the Pareto principle or in
the equity criterion, then the latter allocations should also be selected.
A basic diﬀerence of these axioms from ours is that they treat the
eﬃciency criterion and the equity criterion with equal weight, whereas
our axioms give priority to one of the two criteria. Indeed, there is no
logical relation between Fairness Extension or Fairness Inclusion and
any one or any combination of our axioms concerning eﬃciency and
equity. Moreover, combined with the requirement of Non-Emptiness,
Fairness Inclusion is incompatible with either of our axioms Pareto Ef-
ﬁciency and No-Envy. To see this, let us reconsider the case of funda-
mental conﬂict between the Pareto criterion and the equity-as-no-envy
criterion as in Section 4. In Example 1, the allocation y is Pareto supe-
rior to the allocation x, whereas x is equity-as-no-envy-superior to y.
12 For any set A, #A denotes the cardinality of A.24 Koichi Tadenuma
Then, if a social choice correspondence ' satisﬁes Non-Emptiness and
Fairness Inclusion, then '(fx;yg) = fx;yg. That is, any correspondence
satisfying this axiom avoids selection in face of the fundamental con-
ﬂict. To the contrary, the correspondences satisfying our eﬃciency-ﬁrst
or equity-ﬁrst axioms do make a selection in the case of the fundamental
conﬂict, depending upon which criterion should be placed ﬁrst.
Another diﬀerence between Suzumura (1981a, b) and this paper lies
in the domain of social choice problems. While he considers a class of
abstract social choice problems with no restrictions on individual pref-
erences except rationality, we study the class of canonical economic
problems of distributing inﬁnitely divisible goods among n agents with
preferences that satisfy all standard assumptions in economics. In gen-
eral, with more restrictions on the domain of problems, the more cases
for compatibility among required conditions may arise.13 To put it in
other words, impossibility results obtained in this paper straightfor-
wardly extend to the unrestricted domain.
This paper started with the simple question: “Which criterion
should we take ﬁrst to select socially desirable allocations, the eﬃciency
criterion or the equity criterion?” We have represented two alternative
principles in the form of axioms, and examined choice-consistency of
the social choice correspondences satisfying these axioms. Our results
show that the existence of path independent or contraction consistent
social choice correspondences depends not only on which philosophical
position we take but also on what is the precise notion of equity.
There are many cases in the real life in which we must consider
multiple criteria in individual or social decision-making problems. To
explore general conditions for lexicographic compositions of two criteria
to satisfy various degrees of choice-consistency may be an interesting
topic in future researches.
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